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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS, BOYCE and CORNELL. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Appellant appeals from a judgment denying him loss of 
benefit damages, but, granting him out of pocket damages, 
based on alleged breach of real estate sales contract, where 
seller was unable to pass title through no fault of their own, 
under contract to convey by special warranty deed only. 
DISPOSITION OF T-iL CAS1? IN THE LOWER COURT: 
At tue trial of the cross-complainant*s case, on January 
16th, 1976, to the Court, Honorable James S. Sawaya, sitting with-
out a jury, judgment was rendered against appellant on claim of 
page ?. 
damages for loss-of-bargain amounts, and, against cross-complain-
ants claim for attorneys1 fee allowance, and costs; but, was 
awarded out-of-pocket damages for amounts paid under tne contract. 
STATK.ET3T 0F_FAUTSi 
Supplementing appellant1 s statement _f facts /pages ?-4jf 
appellant1? brief, there are some items affecting these respondents 
and their position in the matter, not stated by aDpellant, or, 
where incorrect conclusions of testimony are taken. Respondents, 
Boyce and Connell entered into a conditional r^al estate contract 
for tne sale of their interests in the real estate herein involved, 
said property being situate in Salt Lake Courty, Utah, under date 
of August 20th, 1972. Warr, the purchaser, had seen the property 
before buying, and was cognizant of its condition /Tr. 53, Rec. ?7j£ 
The contract witn these respondents ^ Exhibit SS/as sellers, provide 
among other tnings, that upon full payment title was to be passed I 
a special warranty deed, prior to tne signing of x:.e contract, a 
title ooinion snow in*/ good title in tne respondents /Exnibit 4l"7, 
was obtained. Respondents nor their representative were not shown 
to have visited the property or inspected tne sai.e at any time. 
Several months after tne signing of the contracts, an action to 
quiet title against respondents-defendants in tnis action was ir-
stituted by the olaintiffs. Trial upon the issues relating to the 
title was had, and title quieted against the defendants-respondents 
herein. No demand was ever made by cross-complaint Warr upon the 
respondents and cross-defendants Boyce and Connell to undertake de-
fense action for Warr, TRec. 276, 275, Tr. 5b and 52ji tout only upo 
Mr. Milton Backman. Trial on cross-complaint resulted in findings 
for these respondents on the matter of damages, except for require-
ment of refunding amounts paid on the contract prior to quiet title 
*age 3 
title action determination herein, the damages allowed being on the 
out of socket rule or basis, rather thai, on the loss-of-bargain rule 
contended for by cross-complainant# 
POINT I -- COVIINAINT OF SPECIAL WARRANT*1 GOV IS (A) vICLY A"AIIT5T 
CLAIMS ARISIMG UND^R, BY, OR THROUGH AC'iS 0! SELLER 
OR GRALTOR, ATiD DOES NOT TTARR'u.T GEL I ^ LLY AGAINS1 
ACTS OF ALL PERSUNS, and (B) PUrlS VENDEE ON NCT1CE 
OR UPON INQUIRY AS TO ADVERSE CLAIMS. 
(A) Since here, trie respondents Bo^ce and Connell, covenanted 
to convey, unon full payment, by special warranty deed, they were not 
liable for any damages on the loss of benefit or bargain theory, when 
their inability to convey was taken from tnem from or by a superior 
title holder, (See Sbcti:n 53, Covenants, 20 Am. Jur. 2nd, page 624, 
where it is stated: 
HA cjve'ifunt of special warranty is one the operation 
of which is restricted to certain persons or claims. 
As a general rule, where a vendee receives a special 
warranty, or quitclaim conveyance, he tatces the estate 
subject to all the disadvantages that it was liable to 
in the hands of the vendor 
and hence protects the grantee against a claim under 
a title from, but not against a claim under a title 
against, or superior to, his grantor/1 
See also, ffhayne v. tacBirney, 257 Pac. 2nd 151, 195 Oklahoma 
269, and Central Life Assurance Co. vs Impelmans, 126 Pacific 2nd 
7o7, 13 Wash. 2nd 631. 
(B) Vendee is put on notice of possible claims by the existence 
or inclusion of the special warranty clause in his deed or contract, 
see 20 Am. Jur. 2nd, page 624, Section cjb, Covenants, wnich states: 
"The fact that a vendor refuses to make a full and 
complete assurance of title is said to be sufficient to 
excite suspicion and put the /othe£7party upon inquiry." 
See also, Jones vs Arthur, 244 S. //• 2nd 469 (Ky.) at page 471, 
Burton vs Price, 141 Southern 728 (Florida), McAbo^ vs Packer, 
187 S. W. 2nd 207 (Mo.}, Kentucky River Coal, Cort). vs Swift Coal 
and Timber Co., 299 S. W. 201 (Ky.); 
Where, as h~re, the purchaser was out on notice of possible 
defects in the title, and thus cannot, especially as stated, th^eunoi 
Page 4. 
claim the benefits of the rule of damages on the loss of benfits 
basis, due to the limitations on vendors liability. 
POINT II -- KL:GL1GE:-JC.:: A^ bASIS FbR FINDING OF "B,VD FAllHff lb 
NOT A PROPER RULE OF LAT JUST I FY I KG AN AV7AHD OF 
DA^GE ON LOSS OF BENEFIT THEORY. 
Appellant cites and quotes from a lone c- se of Shaw vs. Union 
Escrow & Realty Company, 53 Cal. App. 66, POO rec. Pb, ?6, as a basis 
for justifying loss of benefits damages, by assuming that negligence 
equates with bad faith, and thus, whichever rule of damages is deter-
mined to prevail in Utah, makes respondents here liable for loss of ben 
efits. The case in question was appealed to the California Supreme 
Court, which awarded and affirmed the damages on a bad faith basis, 
but which commented on the Court of Appeals reliance on negligence 
as equaling bed faith, as follows: 
"OPINION OF SITPREI/.E COURT IN BANK/DRYING HEARING" 
/?J0 Pacific (C*il.) p. ??7 
"PER CURIAM. f]kj The application for a Hearing in this 
Court after decision by the District Court of Appeal of the 
Second District, Division 1, is denied. 
"We are not prepared to accede to the unqualified state-
ment that gross negligence is the equivalent of bad faith as 
used in Section 3306 of the Civil Code. In this case, however, 
the court below made a finding: 
'That the defendant acted in bad faith in refusing 
to carry out its contract with plaintiff and to con-
vey said property to plaintiff on August 14, 1919, 
and in naving conveyed said property to R# M. Good-
man on June 21, 1919, without making in said convey-
ance provisions for the protection of plaintiff's 
rights in said property secured to him under the 
contract of June b9 1919.f 
Upon looking into the evidence in the case we are satis-
fied that there was sufficient therein to justify the trial court 
in finding that the conduct of the defendants in so refusing 
to perform its contract with plaintiff amounted to bad faith 
within the meaning of that terra as used in said section 3306.* 
It would appear that the portion of the case quoted and relied 
unon by appellant here, and unsupported by any other authority, is 
probably mere dicta, and lacks any basis for such theory bases on 
the ruling of trie higher Supreme Court's decision. 
Page b. 
Ironically, the same case quoted and relied upon above, quotes 
Section 3306 of the California Civil Code, which adopts the same 
rule of out-of-pocket expenses or damages being recoverable (rather 
than loss-of-bargain damages) where good faith exists when vendor*s 
inability to convey occurs, viz.: 
"The detriment caused by the breach of an agreement to 
conv.y an estate in real property, is deemed to be the 
price paid, and the expenses properly incurred in exam-
ining the title andpreparing the necessary papers, with 
interest thereon; but adding thereto, in case of bad 
faith, the difference between/ff^e^WMae paid and the 
value of the estate agreed to be conveyed at the time 
of the breach, and the expenses properly incurred in 
preparing to enter upon the land.* Id. page 26. 
POINT III -- UTAH CASES DECIDED ON BREACH OF CONTRACT 
TO CONVEY REALTY ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE 
RULE THAT BAD FAITH BREACHES ALLOW RECOVER-
ABLE DAMAGES ON BASIS OF LOSS OF BARGAIN 
RULE. 
Utah cases involving breach of contract to convey realty sit-
uations are consistent with the rule that where bad faith is the 
cause of trie breach by vendor, that the loss-of-bargain rule of 
damages anplies. From Dunshee vs. Geoghegan, 7 Utah 11?, where the 
measure of damages was based on the fact that seller had no- title 
whatsoever at the sale date, and thus used the difference between the 
contract price and the value at the time set for conveyance was the 
measure of damages; McBride vs. Stewart, 249 pac. 114 (Utah) where 
buyer sued for and was allowed to recover his payments, Brown vs. 
Cleverly, 70 Pacific 2nd 882, where buyer was allowed to rescind and 
recover his payments, McKellar R. E. & I. Co. vs paxton, 62 Utah 97, 
where the buyer was given right to recover damages for failure of ven-
dor to complete a building contracted for, and Bunnell vs. Bills, 13 
Utah 2nd83, 368 pac. 2nd t>97, where the underhandness of the seller 
in selling to a second buyer without regard to t..e rights of a prior 
bu yer, likewise involves a "bad faith" situation* and the rule an-
Page 6. 
nounced therein by tne Court, while correct on that basis, does not 
go in to the question of "good" and "bad* faith situations. 
POIM IV — UTiu. STATU'IE PRtVIDL G FOR ADOPI10. OF ^l&xh I A// 
^GOiwPASSED ADOPTluN Of 30-CxJLED "SI GLISH fcULE* 
RELATING Tu XAaUR : 0? DMIAGEb IK GOOD A? D ^J) 
FAITH SITUAlKuS. 
Section 65-3-1, Utah CodeAan^tt d> 19L3, reads as follows: ffThe common law of England so far as it is not repugnant 
to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or laws of the 
Unites States, or rne Constitution or laws of this state, 
and so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to 
the natural and physical conditions of t,iis state and the 
necessitios of the peoDle hereof, is hereby adonted ano 
shall be uade the rule of decision in this state.ff 
Statutorily regulated matters are impliedly excluded, Rio 
Grande Western Ry. Co. vs Salt Lake Investment Co•, 35 Utah 528, 
101 pacific 586. This section does not adopt rigor or harshness 
of the common law, but only so much as was and had been generally 
recognized in this country, and as is and was, suitable to our con-
ditions, Hatch vs. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148 Pac. 1096, Canoon vs. 
Pelton, 9 Utah 2nd 224, 342 Pac. 2nd 94. 
AS far back as 1843, Sugden
 Qfi Vendors, Volu e ?, Page 332, 
(6tn American from lOtn London Edition) stated the fact to be 
that: 
w
. . even if he /TendeeT affirms the agreement by bring-
ing an action for non-performance of it, he will obtain nom-
inal damages only for the loss of his bargain, because a pur-
chaser is not entitlec to any corroensation for the fancied 
goodness of his bargain, which ne may supoose he has lost 
where the vendor is without fraud, incapable of making a 
title.11 
While there is some diversity among the American States in the 
matter, we feel the rule cited in Section 522, Am. Jnr. 651, Title, 
Vendor and Purchaser Volume 77, 2nd series, should prevail, and be 
thus included in our law, to-wit: 
"Sec t ion b22. E i f e c t of Vearitarf,a Good F a i t h . 
•'In many j u r i s d i c t i o n s , when the vendor i s unable to 
ir^age 7 . 
convey, a distinction is made regarding the general damages 
recoverable by trie purchaser under a land contract, between 
cases where the vendor acts in good faith in entering into 
the contract, and those in which good faith is wanting. While 
it is generally recognized th'dt the purcnaseer is entitled to 
recover the difference between tne value of the land and the 
agreed price, to recover for the loss of his bargain, where 
the vendor cannot be said to have acted in good faith, it is 
held by many courts, in cases where the vendor does act in 
good faitn, that the measure of damages is the amount of the 
purchase money paid, with interest, thereby denying the^pur-
chaser any recovery for the loss of his bargain. The situa-
tion is analagous to one where a recovery is sought for breach 
of a covenant of warranty orfor quiet enjoyment in a conveyance 
and should be governed by the same rule. n 
Since, in effect Utah has been following the rule to the extent 
of allowing "bad-faith" vendors to be penalized, it should recognize 
the fact that a good faith vendor should only have to respond by 
returning any amounts paid, or costs directly relating to the mak-
ing of the contract. 
POINT V — AMOUNT CF PURCHASE PRICE REFUNDABLE WHILE ERRONEOUS 
~ WAS DUE TO MISINFORMATION FURNISHED BY CCUNSIX FOR 
Ai5PTriLLAKT TO COUNSEL FuR RESPONDENTS. 
in putting final touches on the proposec judgment, later signed 
into effect by the Court, Mr. David Boyce requested payment figures 
on amounts paid these respondents on the contract of sale, and the 
telphoixic response made to a secretary in his office was as follows: 
"David—Mr. 7/e£terbyfs office called. Total of 
checks from Ron //arr to L. A. Boyce, was $3,bU7.?5. 
Didnot include checks toEhlers." 3-17~f76 (©:45A.M. 
This amount was therefore inserted in the judgment, and, became 
fixed upon the signing of the same by the Court. Such principal am-
ount was fully paid to Ron Warr and Joseph C. Rust by check dated 
May 4, 1976, and duly accepted and cleared through the banks. Since 
anpellant is asserting that interest from payment of his installments 
to date of judgment should be at the rate of 8% instead of the statu-
torily rate of 6% to judgment and Q% thereafter settlement of the bal-
ance has not been accomplished, but theB-e-respondents as previously 
Page 8. 
indicated have been willing to nay or repay the difference between 
the face cf the judgment and the actual total of the appellant's 
payments on tne contract. 
POINT VI -- APPELLANT KOI ENTITLED 10 ATTORNEY'S F^ ISS OR COSTS 
IN LoWLR COURT. 
Appellant tfarr seeks counsel fees from respondents, but does 
not make any allocation as between trie various respondents. Further, 
appellant assumes because the Court below permitted or directed re-
turn of payments made by the appellant, that he was the prevailing 
party. The opposite view that respondents prevailed, because no 
loss-of-bargain damages were awarded by the Court below, is just as 
tenable, end, respondents here ^ Record /Tr. 6, Rec. ?29/>acknowledged 
return of the money was in order. Further, no demand on either of 
these resnondents for defense of appellants position was ever made 
^Rec. p75, T78, Tr. 52, 57/ 
Likewise, costs were discretionary with theuo-irt, and, -rs the 
respondents generally prevailed as to the issues, its action in not 
awarding any, unless clearly unwarranted, which is not the case here, 
should not be, as to lower court items, disturbed. 
POINT VII -- iiPPELLANTfS APPRAISAL OF PROPERTY ViiLULo LCT IN 
PROXIkllY TO ALLEGED BREACH, '-md APPRAISER NOT 
BASING COMPARABLES TO APPROXIMATELY SAi E PRCPKRiT . 
The distance of the allegedly comparable tracts used by appellam 
witness, Mr. osgooa were aix a mile to two miles awaj from trie tract 
invjlvad in tni^ litigation, and, Mr. Osgood, tfhile naving some e>;er-
ience was not a lic?nsed appraiser with the expertise that foes with 1 
qualifications required for official licensing. The appraisal figure 
given by respondent's witness wt,re severe,! thousend dollars per acre 
less tnan Mr. Osgood's figure /Tr. SjrfRec. TbiJ 
Page 9. 
C £ N C L U S I £ N 
In view of all the facts, here, the special warranty clause, both 
limiting the respondents1 liability and putting appellant on inquiry 
or notice of possible defects, of the title opinion rendered, and 
the l'jv, \F to damages, and the lower Courtfs interpretation thereof, 
the good faith of the vendors, their agreement to refund payments, 
even though their erroneous amounts was based on information furnish-
ed to counsel nerein by appellant1s counsel, and, the nature of the 
evicence regarding lack of demand for providing a defense for the 
ai)pellantfs position, all warrant the general affirmance of the lower 
Court's findings end conclusions, and, except for the amount of the 
payments made by appellant, should be upheld. 
WHEREFOR respondents pray for affirmance of the judgment, de-
cree, and findings, except for adjustment of the enount to be refund-
ed on appellant1 s purchase money pajmerits. 
Dated this 9th day of August, A. D. 1976. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Tfiobert C .""cUmmi'n^:s)7 AtTo7ney~"for~ "~ 
responden t s Boyce and Conn&ll. 
TRTcku"rd"~s7 Jo^n"son}AtTorney""for 
respondents Boyce and Conne l l . 
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